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ABSTRACT
Motivated by a recent new type of randomized Distributed Denial
of Service (DDoS) attacks on the Domain Name Service (DNS),
we develop novel and efficient distinct heavy hitters algorithms and
build an attack identification system that uses our algorithms.
Heavy hitter detection in streams is a fundamental problem with
many applications, including detecting certain DDoS attacks and
anomalies. A (classic) heavy hitter (HH) in a stream of elements is
a key (e.g., the domain of a query) which appears in many elements
(e.g., requests). When stream elements consist of a 〈key, subkey〉
pairs, (〈domain, subdomain〉) a distinct heavy hitter (dhh) is a
key that is paired with a large number of different subkeys. Our
dHH algorithms are considerably more practical than previous al-
gorithms. Specifically the new fixed-size algorithms are simple to
code and with asymptotically optimal space accuracy tradeoffs.
In addition we introduce a new measure, a combined heavy hit-
ter (cHH), which is a key with a large combination of distinct and
classic weights. Efficient algorithms are also presented for cHH
detection.
Finally, we perform extensive experimental evaluation on real
DNS attack traces, demonstrating the effectiveness of both our al-
gorithms and our DNS malicious queries identification system.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Domain Name System (DNS) service is one of the core ser-
vices in the internet functionality. Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) attacks on DNS service typically consist of many queries
coming from a large botnet. These queries are sent to the root name
server or an authoritative name server along the domain chain. The
targeted name server receives a high volume of requests, which
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may degrade its performance or disable it completely. Such attacks
may also contain spoofed source addresses resulting in a reflection
of the attack or may send requests that generate large responses
(such as an ANY request) to use the DNS for amplification attacks.
According to Akamai’s state of the internet report [3] nearly 20%
of DDoS attacks in Q1 of 2016 involved the DNS service. More-
over, even some of the Internet’s DNS root name servers were tar-
geted [22].
One type of particularly hard to mitigate DDoS attacks are ran-
domized attacks on the DNS service. In these attacks, queries for
many different non-existent subdomains (subkeys) of the same pri-
mary domain (key) are issued [16]). Since the result of a query to
a new subdomain is not cached at the DNS resolver, these queries
are propagated to the domain authoritative server, overloading both
these servers and the open resolvers of the Internet Service Provider.
Motivated by this DNS attack vector we develop in this paper
a new distinct heavy hitter algorithm which is more practical and
accurate than previous algorithms, and build a system for the miti-
gation of this attack based on this algorithm.
Detecting heavy hitters in a stream of requests is a fundamental
problem in data analysis, with applications that include monitoring
for malicious activities and other anomalies. Consider a stream of
DNS queries, with the top-level domain serving as the key. A key
that appears a large number of times in the query stream constitutes
a “classic” heavy hitter (e.g., google.com, cnn.com, etc,). In ad-
dition, each query’s sub-domain serves as the subkey (e.g., mail.,
home., game1., etc,), and a key with many different subkeys is then
a distinct heavy hitters (dHH). As another example, in the case of a
spoofed TCP SYN flood DDoS attack, the packets received consist
of the same destination and many different sources, and therefore
this attack may be represented as a dHH as opposed to a classic
heavy hitter where most of the traffic could be due to a small num-
ber of different sources. Finally, a combined heavy hitter (cHH), a
notion we present and motivate here, is a key with a large combina-
tion of distinct and classic weights. Intuitively, a cHH is a key that
combines both a “classic” heavy hitter as well as a distinct heavy
hitter, meaning it both appears a large number of times in the stream
and has a high number of different sub-keys.
1.1 Contributions of this Paper
1.1.1 Algorithms
Our main contributions are novel practical sampling-based struc-
tures for distinct heavy hitter (dHH) and combined heavy hitter
(cHH) detection whose size (memory requirements in number of
cache entries) are only O(−1) keys, where every key with weight
of at least  fraction of the (respective) total weight is detected with
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high probability. The total weights for HH, dHH and cHH are re-
spectively the total number of items, the total number of distinct
(key;subkey) pairs, and a weighted sum of the two.
Our proposed fixed-size dHH algorithm, named Distinct Weighted
Sampling (dwsHH), requires a constant amount of memory as op-
posed to the well known Superspreaders solution [21] which uses
a linear, to the input stream length, amount of memory. Moreover,
our use of sampling-based distinct counters is a significant practi-
cal improvement over Locher’s relatively new fixed-size solution
[17] which utilizes linear-sketch based distinct counters, which are
much less efficient in practice. In addition, our dHH algorithm pro-
duces a cardinality estimate for each key. This estimate is of much
higher accuracy than the estimate produced by Locher, while the
Superspreaders do not provide comparable estimates.
Our fixed-size cHH algorithm, named Combined Weighted Sam-
pling (cwsHH) is, to the best of our knowledge, the first constant
memory algorithm proposed which considers both the key volume
as well as the distinctness of its subkeys.
Generally, approximate distinct heavy hitters algorithms exhibit
a tradeoff between detection accuracy and the amount of space they
require. Cardinality estimate accuracy is even more difficult to
achieve with a fix-size structure since a key may be evicted from
the cache and then re-enter the cache which presents some uncer-
tainty with regards to cardinality. We provide a solution using a
fix-size structure which outperforms known solutions both in terms
of cardinality accuracy and practicality. A more detailed compari-
son of our results to previous work is shown in Section 8.
1.1.2 Applications
We design a system to detect randomized DNS request attacks.
The design uses our dwsHH and cwsHH algorithms and is en-
hanced to be a complete system for this specific application. Addi-
tional applications of our dwsHH and cwsHH algorithms are given
in Section 6
1.1.3 Evaluation
We demonstrate, via experimental evaluations on both real inter-
net traces and synthetically generated data, the effectiveness of our
dwsHH and cwsHH algorithms as well as our system for detection
of randomized DNS request attacks.
1.2 Paper Organization
Section 2 provides required definitions and background. In Sec-
tion 3 we discuss our algorithms for distinct weighted sampling,
followed by a discussion of our combined weighted sampling scheme
in Section 4. Section 5 describes experimental evaluation of our al-
gorithms. In Section 6 we describe the randomized DDoS attacks
on DNS servers and our proposed system for mitigation of such at-
tacks as well as an evaluation of our system. Section 8 summarizes
related work, and Section 9 concludes the paper.
2. PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATIONS
2.1 Problem Definitions
Formally, our input is modeled as a stream of elements, where
each element has a primary key x from a domain X and a subkey y
from domain Dx. For each key, the (classic) weight hx is the num-
ber of elements with key x, the distinct weight wx is the number
of different subkeys in elements with key x, and, for a parameter
ρ 1, the combined weight is b(ρ)x ≡ ρhx + wx. In the particular
example of a DNS resolver, hx is the total number of requests for
a primary domain x and wx ≤ hx is the number of distinct sub-
domains. Combined weights are interesting as they can be a more
accurate measure of the load due to key x than one of hx or wx
in isolation: All hx requests are processed but the wx distinct ones
are costlier. For DNS resolvers, the distinct requests are costlier
because their responses aren’t in the cache.
A key x with weight that is at least an  fraction of the (respec-
tive) total is referred to as a heavy hitter: When hx ≥ ∑y hy , x
is a (classic) heavy hitter (HH), when wx ≥ ∑y wy , x is a dis-
tinct heavy hitter (dHH) or superspreader [21], and when b(ρ)x ≥

∑
y b
(ρ)
y , x is a combined heavy hitter (cHH).
The notations used throughout the paper are summarized in Ta-
ble 1.
Symbol Meaning
x key
y subkey
hx number of elements with key x
wx number of different subkeys in elements with key x
m maxx wx
τ detection threshold
k cache size
` number of buckets
ρ combined weight parameter
Table 1: Notations
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Sample and Hold
The Sample and Hold (S&H) algorithm [14, 11] is applied to a
stream of elements, where each element has a key x. The weight
hx of a key x is the number of elements with this key.
The fixed threshold design is specified for a threshold τ . The
algorithm maintains a cache S of keys, which is initially empty,
and a counter cx for each cached key x. A new element with key
x is processed as follows: If x ∈ S is in the cache, the counter
cx is incremented. Otherwise, a counter cx ← 1 is initialized with
probability τ . The fixed-size design is specified for a fixed sample
(cache) size k and works by effectively lowering the threshold τ to
the value that would have resulted in k cached keys.
An important property of S&H is that the set of sampled keys
is a probability proportional to size without replacement (ppswor)
sample of keys according to weights hx [20].
2.2.2 Approximate Distinct Counters
A distinct counter is an algorithm that maintains the number of
different keys in a stream of elements. An exact distinct counter
requires state that is proportional to the number of different keys
in the stream. Fortunately, there are many existing designs and im-
plementations of approximate distinct counters that have a small
relative error but use state size that is only logarithmic or double
logarithmic in the number of distinct elements [13, 8, 5, 12, 9]. The
basic idea is elegant and simple: We apply a random hash function
to each element, and retain the smallest hash value. We can see
that this value, in expectation, would be smaller when there are
more distinct elements, and thus can be used to estimate this num-
ber. The different proposed structures have different ways of en-
hancing this approach to control the error. The tradeoff of structure
size and error are controlled by a parameter `: A structure of size
proportional to ` has normalized root mean square error (NRMSE)
of 1/
√
`. In Section 3 we use distinct counters as a black box in
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our dHH structures, abstracted as a class of objects that support the
following operations:
• Init: Initializes a sketch of an empty set
• Merge(x): merge the string x into the set (x could already
be a member of the set or a new string).
• CardEst: return an estimate on the cardinality of the set
(with a confidence interval)
In Section 3.4, we also propose a design where a particular algo-
rithm for approximate distinct counting is integrated in the dHH
detection structure.
3. DISTINCT WEIGHTED SAMPLING
We now present our distinct weighted sampling schemes, which
take as input elements that are key and subkey pairs. We build on
the fixed-threshold and fixed-size classic S&H schemes but make
some critical adjustments: First, we apply hashing so that we can
sample the distinct stream instead of the classic stream. Second,
instead of using simple counters cx for cached keys as in classic
S&H, we use approximate distinct counters applied to subkeys.
Third, we maintain state per key that is suitable for estimating the
weight of heavy cached keys (whereas classic S&H was designed
for unbiased domain queries).
Our algorithms, in essence, compute heavy hitters using weighted
sampling. A sample set of the keys is maintained during the execu-
tion of each of the algorithms (HH, dHH, or cHH). The sample set
constitutes a weighted sample according to the respective counts
so that the heavier keys, in particular the heavy hitters, are much
more likely to be included than other keys. The counts in each of
the algorithms are different; number of repetitions, measure of dis-
tinctness, and a combined measure, respectively. The algorithms
maintain counts with each cached key which allow to produce the
cardinality estimate for each output key.
3.1 Fixed-threshold Distinct Heavy Hitters
Our fixed-threshold distinct heavy hitters algorithm is applied
with respect to a specified threshold parameter τ . We make use of
a random hash function Hash ∼ U [0, 1]. An element (x, y) is pro-
cessed as follows. If the key x is not cached, then if Hash(x, y)
(applied to the key and subkey pair (x, y)) is below τ , we initialize
a dCounters[x] object (and say that now x is cached) and insert
the string (x, y). If the key x is already in the cache, we merge the
string (x, y) into the distinct counter dCounters[x]. The pseudo
code is omitted due to lack of space and can be found in the tech-
nical report [2].
3.2 Fixed-size distinct weighted sampling
The fixed-size Distinct Weighted Sampling (dwsHH) algorithm
is specified for a cache size k. Compared with the fixed-threshold
algorithm, we keep some additional state for each cached key:
• The threshold τx when x entered the cache (represented in
the pseudocode as dCounters[x].τ ). The purpose of main-
taining τx is deriving confidence intervals on wx. Intuitively,
τx captures a prefix of elements with key x which were seen
before the distinct structure for x was initialized, and is used
to estimate the number of distinct subkeys in this prefix.
• A value seed(x) ≡ min(x,y)in stream Hash(x,y) which is
the minimum Hash(x,y) of all elements with key x. (in
the pseudocode, dCounters[x].seed represents seed(x)).
Note that it suffices to track seed(x) only after the key x is
inserted into the cache, since all elements that occurred be-
fore the key entered the cache necessarily had Hash(x,y) >
τx, as the entry threshold τ can only decrease over time.
The fixed-size dwsHH algorithm retains in the cache only the k
keys with lowest seeds. The effective threshold value τ that we
work with is the seed of the most recently evicted key. The ef-
fective threshold has the same role as the fixed threshold since it
determines the (conditional) probability on inclusion in the sample
for a key with certain wx. A pseudo code is provided as Algorithm
1.
Algorithm 1: Fixed-size streaming Distinct Weighted Sampling (dw-
sHH)
Data: cache size k, stream of elements of the form (key,subkey),
where keys are from domain X
Output: set of (x, cx, τx) where x ∈ X
dCounters← ∅; τ ← 1 // Initialize a cache of
distinct counters
foreach stream element with key x and subkey b do // Process a
stream element
if x is in dCounters then
dCounters[x].Merge(x,y)
dCounters[x].seed←
min{dCounters[x].seed,Hash(x,y)}
else
if Hash(x,y) < τ then // Create dCounters[x]
dCounters[x].Init
dCounters[x].Merge(x,y)
dCounters[x].seed← Hash(x,y)
dCounters[x].τ ← τ
if |dCounters| > k then
x← argmaxy∈dCounters dCounters[y].seed
τ ← dCounters[x].seed
Delete dCounters[x]
return(For x in dCounters,
(x, dCounters[x].CardEst, dCounters[x].τ))
3.3 Analysis and estimates
We first consider the sample distribution S of dwsHH. As we
mentioned (Section 2.2.1), it is known that classic S&H applied
with weights hx has the property that the set of sampled keys is
a ppswor sample according to hx [10]. Surprisingly, the sample
distribution properties of S&H carries over from being with re-
spect to hx (classic S&H) to being with respect to wx (dwsHH).
We obtain that key x is very likely to be sampled when wx 
maxi∈[0,k−1](m −
∑
x∈topi wx)/(k − i) where topi is the set of
i heaviest keys. A detailed explanation of this bound with relevant
proofs are omitted due to lack of space and can be found in the
technical report [2].
3.3.1 Estimate quality and confidence interval
With the fixed-threshold scheme, we expect the sample size to
include τ
∑
y wy keys even when all keys have wx = 1. With the
fixed-size (dwsHH) scheme, we expect the cache to include keys
with wx  ∑y wy/k but it may also include some keys with
small weight.
For many applications, an estimate on the weightwx of the heavy
hitters is needed. We compute an estimate with a confidence inter-
val on wx for each cached key x, using the entry threshold τ (or
dCounters[x].τ in the fixed-size scheme) and the approximate dis-
tinct count dCounters[x].CardEst.
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We obtain the confidence interval [dCounters[x].CardEst −
aδσ2, dCounters[x].CardEst− 1 + 1/τ + aδ
√
σ21 + σ
2
2 ]
where aδ is the coefficient for confidence 1 − δ according to
the normal approximation. E.g., for 95% confidence we can use
aδ = 2.
We note the confidence intervals are tighter (and thus better) for
keys that are presented earlier and thus have τx  τ .
Further explanations can be found in the technical report [2].
3.4 Integrated dwsHH design
We propose a seamless design (Integrated dwsHH) which inte-
grates the hashing performed for the weighted sampling component
with the hashing performed for the approximate distinct counters.
We use a particular type of distinct counters based on stochastic
averaging (`-partition) [13, 12] (see [9] for an overview). This de-
sign hashes strings to ` buckets and maintains the minimum hash
in each bucket. These counters are the industry’s choice as they
use fewer hash computations. We estimate the distinct counts us-
ing the tighter HIP estimators [9]. Pseudocode for the fixed-size
Integrated dwsHH is provided as Algorithm 2. The parameter k is
the sample size and the parameter ` is the number of buckets. Note,
we use two independent random hash functions applied to strings:
BucketOf returns an integer ∼ U [0, `− 1] selected uniformly at
random. Hash returns ∼ U [0, 1] (O(logm) bits suffice).
As in the generic Algorithm 1, we maintain an object dCounters[x]
for each cached key x. The object includes the entry threshold
dCounters[x].τ and dCounters[x].seed, which is the minimum
Hash(x,y) of all elements (x, y) with key x. The object also
maintains ` values c[i] for i = 0, . . . , `−1 from the range of Hash,
where c[i] is the minimum Hash over all elements (x, y) such that
the element was processed after xwas cached and BucketOf(x,y)
is equal to i (c[i] = 1 when this set is empty). Note that
dCounters[x].seed ≡ mini∈[0,`−1] c[i]. The object also main-
tains a HIP estimate CardEst of the number of distinct subkeys
since the counter was created.
For a sampled x, we can obtain a confidence interval on wx us-
ing the lower end point dCounters[x].CardEst + 1, with error
controlled by the distinct counter and the upper end point
dCounters[x].CardEst+1/dCounters[x].τ , with error controlled
by both the distinct counter and the entry threshold. The errors
are combined as explained in Section 3.3.1 using the HIP error of
σ2 ≈ (2`)−0.5dCounters[x].CardEst .
The size of our structure is O(k` logm) and the representation
of the k cached keys. Note that the parameter ` can be a constant
for DDoS applications: A choice of ` = 50 gives NRMSE of 10%.
Note, that this design can be further optimized according to re-
source constraints as explained in the technical report [2].
4. COMBINED WEIGHTED SAMPLING
We now present our cwsHH algorithm for combined heavy hit-
ters detection. The pseudocode, which builds on our Integrated dw-
sHH design (Algorithm 2), is presented in Algorithm 3 and works
with a specified parameter ρ. For each cached key x, the com-
bined weighted sampling (cwsHH) algorithm also includes a clas-
sic counter dCounters[x].f of the number of elements with key x
processed after x entered the cache.
Similarly to dwsHH, if we are only interested in the set of sam-
pled keys (cHH candidates), it suffices to maintain the seed values
of cached keys without the counting and distinct counting struc-
tures. The counters are useful for obtaining estimates and confi-
dence intervals on the combined weights of cached keys: For a
desired confidence level 1 − δ. The lower end of the interval is
dCounters[x].CardEst + ρdCounters[x].f − aδσ1, where σ1
Algorithm 2: Integrated dwsHH
Data: cache size k, distinct structure parameter `, stream of
(key,subkey) pairs
Output: set of (x, cx, τx) where x ∈ X
dCounters← ∅; τ ← 1 // Initialize a cache of
distinct counters
foreach stream element with key x and subkey y do // Process a
stream element
if x is in dCounters then
if Hash(x,y) < dCounters[x].c[BucketOf(x,y)] then
dCounters[x].CardEst +←
`/
∑`−1
i=0 dCounters[x].c[i]
dCounters[x].c[BucketOf(x,y)]← Hash(x,y)
dCounters[x].seed←
min{dCounters[x].seed,Hash(x,y)}
else
if Hash(x,y) < τ then // Initialize dCounters[x]
for i = 0, . . . , `− 1 do dCounters[x].c[i]← 1
dCounters[x].CardEst← 0
dCounters[x].c[BucketOf(x,y)]← Hash(x,y)
dCounters[x].seed← Hash(x,y)
dCounters[x].τ ← τ
if |dCounters| > k then
x← argmaxy∈dCounters dCounters[y].seed
τ ← dCounters[x].seed
Delete dCounters[x]
return(For x ∈ dCounters,
(x, dCounters[x].CardEst, dCounters[x].τ))
is the standard error of the distinct count. For the higher end,
we bound the contribution of the prefix, which has expectation
bounded by 1/τ − 1, and subject both to the S&H error and the
approximate distinct counter error, so we obtain
dCounters[x].CardEst+ρdCounters[x].f −aδσ1−1 + 1/τ +
aδ
√
σ21 + σ
2
2 .
5. EVALUATION
5.1 Theoretical Comparison
In Table 2 we show a theoretical memory usage comparison of
our algorithms, SuperSpreaders and Locher [17], assuming all al-
gorithms use the same distinct count primitive. We are using the
notations in Table 1, δ as the probability that a given source be-
comes a false negative or a false positive, N as the number of dis-
tinct pairs, r as the number of estimates, s as the number of pairs
of distinct counting primitives used to compute each estimate, and
c (for a c-superspreader (i.e. we want to find keys with more than c
distinct elements) choosing c = τ−1.As we can also see from the
table, the cache size affects the distinct weight estimation error for
the keys.
5.2 Fixed-size distinct weighted sampling (dw-
sHH)
We have done extensive testing of our algorithms both on real
internet traffic traces and on synthetically generated data.
We begin our evaluation with the results of tests done on packets
from a trace from The CAIDA UCSD Anonymized Internet Traces
2014 [1]. For each packet, the destination IP address is the key, and
the source IP address is the value. In order to display the full ability
of our algorithm, we added into this data synthetic packets which
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Figure 1: Distinct Weighted Sampling (dwsHH) test results (cache 2000)
form keys with many distinct values. Specifically, the synthetic
packets all have unique subkeys and contain 4 keys, such that the
keys have cardinalities 2000, 1000, 500 and 250. The entire data
is made up of approximately 1M (993750) {key, value} pairs,
containing 33977 keys and 52859 distinct pairs.
We evaluate the accuracy of our Fixed-Size dwsHH algorithm
(see Section 3.2). The results presented are based on the imple-
mentation of Algorithm 2. We set the cache size k = 2000 and
distinct structure parameter ` = 64. We compare, both in terms
of accuracy and space, our algorithm to a simple and highly ineffi-
cient algorithm which counts the number of distinct values associ-
ated with each key. Fig. 1a shows the cardinality estimate (Cardest)
calculated by the algorithm in this test, compared to the actual dis-
tinct count of each of these keys. We can see that the algorithm
provides relatively accurate estimates, with the average error of the
Cardest, measured by the average distance between the Cardest and
the real distinct count was 1.5, with a median error of 1. In terms
of memory usage, our algorithm consumes a constant amount of
space, while the simple algorithm consumes space that is linear
with the number of distinct pairs seen. The memory consumption
of both algorithms is depicted in Fig. 1c. While we chose to com-
pare memory usage with the simplified Superspreaders algorithm
- the one filter algorithm, its two filter variant algorithm reaches a
better asymptotic memory usage model. However, the two filter
variant is more complicated and its memory usage is more suscep-
tible to implementation factors but in any event, its memory usage
still grows linearly with the stream length. Fig. 2 shows the injected
Caida tests performed with cache size k = 500. The confidence in-
terval for the cardinality estimate is shown in Fig. 2c
As explained in Section 3.3, our algorithm seeks to find keys
with a cardinality over t =
∑
y wy/k. To evaluate the false pos-
itive (FP) and false negative (FN) rates of our algorithm, we set t
to be the threshold and evaluate the keys’ deviation. Any key x
with a cardinality wx > t that is not reported by our algorithm
(not in cache) and has a high deviation from t (normalized by the
cardinality error), is a FN. FPs are defined respectively - a key x
that is reported with a cardinality wx < t and a high deviation
from t. Fig. 1b shows the distinct count of keys that were re-
ported (in cache) by the algorithm, and those that were not reported
(not in cache - the red colored circles shown). Note that gener-
ally, the algorithm will also cache keys which have a distinct count
much lower than t. We use the Cardest to select only keys with a
Cardest that is above t. In the example shown, only 12 out of the
2000 cached keys had Cardest value higher than the real distinct
count, all of these overestimates were within the confidence inter-
val bounds - within error bounds. In the same example, we found
18 (9 depicted in graph) potential FN - unreported keys above the
threshold set, but all of which are within one standard deviation
shown by the dotted line. Note that we can tune parameters to ob-
tain a near-zero FN rate instead of a near-zero FP since both the
number of overall distinct pairs as well as the cache size affect this
threshold.
5.3 Combined Weighted Sampling
We test our streaming cwsHH algorithm (see Section 4) on the
data described above, with ρ = 0.1. The cwsHH algorithm samples
keys according to their combined weight. This is depicted in Fig. 3,
where for each key we compare the actual count, the distinct count
and the combined weight of the key. We can see that the algorithm
properly identifies the keys with highest combined weights and that
those keys are different than when sampling by distinct weights.
For example, item 28 which is unreported in Fig. 2b, has a very
high number of non-distinct queries and therefore is reported as
item 18 in Fig. 3.
Figure 3: cwsHH: Algorithm estimates of reported vs. unreported
keys.
6. RANDOMIZED SUB-DOMAIN DDOS AT-
TACKS ON DNS
6.1 Attack Description
The DNS is a hierarchical distributed naming system for trans-
lating more readily domain names to the numerical IP addresses.
The DNS distributes the responsibility by designating authoritative
name servers for each domain.
The Random Subdomain DDoS (RSDDoS) attack on DNS (also
known as the Random QNAME attack or the Nonsense Name at-
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Figure 2: Distinct Weighted Sampling (dwsHH) test results (cache 500)
Algorithm 3: Streaming cwsHH
Data: cache size k, distinct structure parameter `, parameter ρ, stream
(key,subkey) pairs
Output: set of (x, cx, fx, τx) where x ∈ X
dCounters← ∅; τ ← 1 // Initialize a cache of
distinct counters
foreach stream element with key x and subkey y do // Process a
stream element
erand← 1− (1− rand())1/ρ // Randomization for
hx count
if x is in dCounters then
dCounters[x].f +← 1// Increment count
if Hash(x,y) < dCounters[x].c[BucketOf(x,y)] then
dCounters[x].CardEst +←
`/
∑`−1
i=0 dCounters[x].c[i]
dCounters[x].c[BucketOf(x,y)]← Hash(x,y)
dCounters[x].seed←
min{dCounters[x].seed,Hash(x,y), erand}
else
if min{erand,Hash(x,y)} < τ then // Initialize
dCounters[x]
for i = 0, . . . , `− 1 do dCounters[x].c[i]← 1
dCounters[x].CardEst← 0
dCounters[x].f ← 1
dCounters[x].c[BucketOf(x,y)]← Hash(x,y)
dCounters[x].seed← min{Hash(x,y), erand}
dCounters[x].τ ← τ
if |dCounters| > k then
x← argmaxy∈dCounters dCounters[y].seed
τ ← dCounters[x].seed
Delete dCounters[x]
return(For x ∈ dCounters,
(x, dCounters[x].CardEst, dCounters[x].f, dCounters[x].τ))
tack [16]) has recently become a rising threat to the DNS service.
In this type of attack, the queries sent for the victim’s domain in-
clude many different randomly generated or highly varying sub-
domains. For example, an attack query may be of the form: bjsu-
fyd.www.google.com: type A, Class IN
While the main target might be the victim’s authoritative name
server, the attack also has collateral damage and impacts the Open
Resolver domain name servers as well as DNS-caches, which are
operated by intermediate Internet service providers. This occurs
since these queries will avoid the caching mechanism of the open
resolver.
Detection of RSDDoS attacks is difficult due both to the large
Algorithm Memory usage Keys’ distinct weightestimation error
Fixed-threshold dis-
tinct WS
O(τ
∑
y wy · ` logm)
(Exp.) τ
−1 + wy/
√
2`
Fixed-size dwsHH O(k` logm)
(1/k)
∑
y wy +
wy/
√
2`
Superspreaders 1-
Level Filtering [21] O(
N
c
) NA
Superspreaders 2-
Level Filtering [21] O(
N
c
ln 1
δ
) NA
Locher [17] O(rs · 2`+ |k|) NA
Table 2: Theoretic Comparison between methods
number of sources from which the queries are received, as well
as the general structure of the attack packets. The packets that
comprise this type of attack are DNS queries which have a legit-
imate form but request a nonexistant domain or subdomain. De-
tection is made even more difficult by the increasing usage of dis-
posable domains. These are large volumes of automatically gener-
ated domains, legitimately created by top sites and services (e.g.,
social networks and search engines), to give some signal to their
server [7].
The current solution of internet providers so far has been to man-
ually identify the targeted zone and to temporarily prevent the name
server from sending queries for this zone [16] (or alternatively to
reduce the number of queries using rate limiting). The solution we
propose identifies the targeted zone automatically. Furthermore, by
analyzing the peacetime traffic we are able to automatically identify
some of the legitimate requests for the targeted domain, to signifi-
cantly reduce the false positives of our system. Using our proposed
system, attacks can be mitigated quickly and accurately.
6.2 Attack Query Identification System
We provide an overview for a system which identifies attack
queries of the form VAR.victimdomain.com. That is, queries that
consist of a random (or automatically generated) string as a prefix
of the domain (in the least significant domain sub-part), which have
so far been the most common query form in these attacks. The sys-
tem detects RSDDoS attacks on DNS servers and creates signatures
for subsequent mitigation. Queries are processed with the key be-
ing the victimdomain.com and the subkey being the VAR part of the
query. We are currently developing a system that expands mitiga-
tion capabilities to additional forms of these attacks. This advanced
system is beyond the scope of this paper.
Traffic analysis is done in two stages. The first stage is a pre-
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processing of peacetime traffic, the second is an analysis of traffic
during an attack. Our analysis makes use of both a Distinct Heavy
Hitters module such as the combined sketch described in Section 4
and a Classic Heavy Hitters module such as that of Metwally et.
al. [18].
As can be seen in Fig. 4a, during peacetime, queries are pro-
cessed as follows:
1. Query parsing: 〈key, subkey〉 is extracted.
2. The 〈key, subkey〉 pair is inserted into our streaming combined
weighted sampling module: This mechanism identifies zones (keys)
that are heavily queried, and have a large number of distinct sub-
domains (subkeys). The output of this module is used to create a
white-list of zones that are combined heavy hitters and most likely
use disposable domains as part of their routine behaviour.
3. The subkey is inserted into a classic heavy hitters module: The
output of this module generates a white-list of subdomains (sub-
keys) that appear frequently in the DNS queries. When mitigating
an attack, the requests with a subkey from this list should not be
blocked. The motivation for this is to identify strings which are
commonly used as subdomains, and are therefore not likely to be
randomly generated. Using this white-list minimizes the false pos-
itives when mitigating an attack with the signatures we generate.
As shown in Fig. 4b, in the detection phase the system identifies
the attacked domains as follows:
1. Query parsing: key and subkey are extracted.
2. The 〈key, subkey〉 pair is inserted into our streaming combined
weighted sampling module: During an RSDDoS attack, the zones
which are identified as having highly distinct subdomains and are
heavy hitters, are suspected as being the victims. The output of this
module is therefore used to create an initial set of attack signatures.
3. White-list filter: The white-lists created during the peacetime
processing are used to filter out legitimate queries and therefore
reduce the false positive rate of the system. Two types of filters are
used:
• Subkey white-list: If the query subkey was identified as being
frequent during peacetime, we assume that this is not an au-
tomatically generated subkey and therefore the query is con-
sidered to be legitimate. In this manner, legitimate queries of
attacked domains may be serviced.
• Key white-list: the zones that have been identified as white-
list domains in peacetime are filtered out since these are zones
which have a large number of distinct sub-domains as part
of their regular operation, e.g., disposable domains. We note
however, that detection of attacks on disposable domains (which
have been white-listed) is left for the full paper where the
amounts of distinct values detected by the combined weighted
sampling algorithm at attack time are compared with those of
peace time, and if a notable increase is observed then an at-
tack is signaled and a corresponding (see below) mitigation
is suggested. Note that bloom filters can be used to speed up
whitelist search as described in [6].
The above system creates a list of domains which are likely under
attack. Mitigation is thus proposed by filtering out DNS requests
to these domains except if the VAR part appears in the subdomain
white-list generated at peacetime. Therefore, the suggested mit-
igation would first allow the queries for domains with white-list
subkeys, and then block the requests to the domains suspected to
be under attack.
6.3 System Evaluation
The RSDDoS DNS attack query identification system presented
above has been evaluated on traces of actual RSDDoS attacks cap-
tured by a large ISP.
We analyzed 5 captures which were sniffed during different RS-
DDoS attacks and contained both attack and legitimate DNS queries.
All captures were taken within a single month in 2014. Note that
most of the captures contain 5000 queries as that was the set amount
that was sniffed for each attack spotted. The ISP identified the RS-
DDoS attacks as they were occurring. The victim was the author-
itative name servers of the ISP (the victim domain belongs to one
of the ISP’s clients) or the Open Resolvers of the ISP (the victim
domain does not belong to the ISP). We compare our results to the
analysis performed manually by the ISP. We use Cache size k = 50
and distinct structure parameter ` = 256. Note that, some of the
attacks analyzed had a very high percentage of distinct queries and
others had lower rates. The repetitions are of randomly generated
queries that were each repeated several times in the traffic. These
different attack rates are an example for the usefulness of both the
cHH and dHH algorithms. As we did not have access to a peace-
time capture to obtain a whitelist, we generated a whitelist based
on domains with a relatively high distinct subdomain count.
Consider attack 1 in Table 3. The capture consisted of 92469
DNS queries. Of these, 4133 are attack queries targeted at the same
zone, with a randomly generated least significant domain sub-part,
containing 2051 distinct queries, meaning that some of the queries
were repeated. Of the 4133 queries, the system counted 4123.
Meaning, that 10 queries for the attacked zone had gone through
before the zone was placed in the structure (i.e., in the cache). Once
inside, the zone was not evicted from the structure at any point, all
subsequent queries were counted, hence 99.8% of the queries were
identified.
Source Queries in
capture
Attack
queries
Distinct attack
queries
Attack queries
identified
1 92469 4133 2051 99.8%
2 5000 389 367 99.7%
3 5000 602 567 100%
4 5000 334 330 100%
5 5000 3364 631 99.8%
Table 3: Results on Real DNS Attack Captures
7. ADDITIONAL APPLICATIONS
Our algorithms are instrumentals in the detection and mitigation
of various DDoS and other network attacks. In this section we
provide several examples of such attacks.
7.1 SYN Attacks
A classic form of DDoS attacks still common in today’s networks
is the TCP SYN Attack. In this form of attack, the attacker initi-
ates many TCP connections, while never completing the TCP hand-
shake. The connection queue of the target is therefore filled up with
incomplete connections, preventing it from addressing new connec-
tion requests from legitimate parties. The attacker may make an at-
tack more difficult to detect by utilizing a botnet or a large army of
sources for carrying out the attack or even by simply using spoofed
sources. In this case, the attacked destination receives connection
requests from many different sources. Using our algorithm, we can
identify destinations which have a large number of distinct sources,
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(a) Peacetime packet processing (b) Attack time packet processing
Figure 4: Packet Processing
and thus be able to identify the attack soon after the number of re-
quested connections exceeds normal use.
7.2 Email Spam
Email spam is often characterized by having a single sender or
a small number of senders which send emails to a large number
of different recipients. By making the sender the key and the ad-
dressee as the subkey, our algorithm can easily detect spammers.
Using peacetime along the lines suggested in Section 6 can im-
prove the system accuracy and reducing false positives.
7.3 Flash Crowd Detection
Combined heavy hitters may be used, for example, when net-
work load is a concern. Consider a flash event. A flash crowd
or flash event, is a situation where a very large number of users
simultaneously access some web site [15]. For example, a major
developing news event may cause a flash crowd in major news web
sites. Fast and automated detection and processing (mitigation or
other responses) of such anomalies is important for maintaining ro-
bustness of the network service.
To identify the affects a flash crowd has on the entire network,
it is not sufficient to solely identify the rise in the distinct number
of users accessing a site. Instead, we would like to identify that
there are both many accesses to this site causing a high load on the
network as well as many different users who are accessing this site.
For a network administrator to reallocate network resources to meet
this demand, both of these measurements are significant. Our cw-
sHH algorithm can be used to identify the rise in both parameters.
8. RELATED WORK
The concept of distinct heavy hitters, together with the motiva-
tion for DDoS attack detection, was introduced in a seminal paper
of Venkataraman et al [21]. Their algorithm, aimed at detection
of fixed-threshold heavy hitters, returns as candidate heavy hitters
the keys with an (initialized) Bloom filter that is filled beyond some
threshold. Keys with high count in the sample are likely to be heavy
hitter and almost saturate their bloom filter. A related work adapts
dHH schemes to TCAMs [4]. Our fixed-threshold scheme is con-
ceptually related to [21]. Some key differences are the better trade-
offs we obtain by using approximate distinct counters instead of
Bloom filters, and our simpler structure with analysis that ties it di-
rectly to classic analysis of weighted sampling, which also simpli-
fies the use of parameters. More importantly, we provide a solution
to the fixed-size problem and also address the estimation problem.
The estimates on the weight of the heavy keys that can be obtained
from the Bloom filters in [21] are much weaker, since once the filter
is saturated, it can not distinguish between heavy and very heavy
keys.
Locher [17] recently presented two designs for dHH detection
which makes use of approximate distinct counters. The first de-
sign is sampling-based and builds on the distinct pair sampling ap-
proach of [21]. This design also only applies to the fixed-threshold
problem. The other design uses linear sketches and applies to the
fixed-size problem. Locher’s designs are weaker than ours both in
terms of practicality and in terms of theoretical bounds. The linear-
sketch based design utilizes linear-sketch based distinct counters,
which are much less efficient in practice that the sampling-based
ones. The designs have a quadratically worse dependence of struc-
ture size on the detection threshold τ , which is Ω(τ−2) instead
of our O(τ−1). Finally, multiple copies of the same structure are
maintained to boost up confidence, which results in a large over-
head, since heavy hitters are accounted for in most copies. Locher’s
code was not available for a direct comparison.
Another conceivable approach is to convert to DHH classic fixed-
size deterministic HH streaming algorithms, such as Misra Gries
[19] or the space saving algorithm [18], by replacing counters with
approximate distinct counters. The difficulty that arises is that the
same distinct element may affect the structure multiple times when
the same key re-enters the cache, resulting in much weaker guaran-
tees on the quality of the results.
9. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented new and efficient algorithms for distinct Heavy
Hitters and combined Heavy Hitters detection, as well as a system
for detection of RSDDoS attacks on the DNS service.
We are currently working on a more robust DNS random attack
detection and mitigation system for both non-existent domain at-
tacks and other forms of random subdomain attacks.
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